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APPLICATION OF THE AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCE RULE
TO THE RESIDENTIAL LEASEHOLD AGREEMENT
INTRODUCTION
When a residential tenant abandons leased premises1 he breaches a
duty owed to his landlord to fulfill the terms of the leasehold agreement.2
According to accepted principles of contract law, the avoidable conse-
quence rule3 requires a party who suffers a breach of contract to make
reasonable efforts to minimize his damages.4 This Note examines the
controversy over whether the avoidable consequence rule requires a land-
lord to minimize his damages occasioned by the tenant's breach of the
leasehold agreement.5 Jurisdictions have approached this problem
1. An abandonment occurs when a tenant physically vacates the premises with no
intent to return and ceases to make rental payments due under the leasehold agreement.
See tenBraak v. Waffle Shops, Inc., 542 F.2d 919, 924 n.5 (4th Cir. 1976). See generally 1
Am. Law of Property, § 3.99, at 390 (A. Casner ed. 1952). The abandonment must mani-
fest "an absolute relinquishment of [the] premises by a tenant." Moore v. Northwest
Fabricators, Inc., 51 Wash. 2d 26, 27, 314 P.2d 941, 942 (1957). This is a factual ques-
tion determined by the tenant's intent to relinquish all rights in the leasehold estate. See
Butler Prods. Co. v. Roush, 153 Ariz. 500, 502, 738 P.2d 775, 777 (Ct. App. 1987).
2. See tenBraak, 542 F.2d at 924 n.5; Humbach, The Common Law Conception of
Leasing: Mitigation, Habitability, and Dependence of Covenants, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 1213,
1237 n.1ll (1983).1 3. Under the avoidable consequence rule, a party who has suffered a breach of con-
tract may not sit idly by and allow damages to accumulate. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 489 (1916); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
236 U.S. 512, 526 (1915); McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 299, 398 A.2d 1283, 1295
(1979). See generally Restatement of Contracts § 336(1) comment d (1932). The avoida-
ble consequence rule denies recovery of any damages flowing from consequences that the
aggrieved plaintiff reasonably could have avoided. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 241 U.S.
at 489; United States Fidelity Guar. Co., 236 U.S. at 526; Stipp v. Karasawa, 318 S.W.2d
172, 175 (Mo. 1958); McDonald, 79 N.J. at 299, 398 A.2d at 1295; Theiler v. Tillamook
County, 81 Or. 277, 158 P. 804, 805 (1916). See generally J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Con-
tracts, § 14-15, at 610 (3d ed. 1987); D. Dobbs, Remedies § 12.6 (1973).
Often, the avoidable consequence rule is expressed as a duty on the part of the ag-
grieved plaintiff to mitigate his damages or as an obligation to take reasonable action to
avoid increasing damages caused by the breaching defendant. See Lynch v. Call, 261
F.2d 130, 132 (10th Cir. 1958); American Casualty Co. v. Glorfield, 216 F.2d 250, 253
(9th Cir. 1954); John S. Doane Co. v. Martin, 164 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1947). This formu-
lation, however, inaccurately expresses the avoidable consequence rule. See generally J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 14-15, at 610-611 (3d ed. 1987). Similar to other prin-
ciples limiting recoverable damages, the avoidable consequence rule places no affirmative
duty whatsoever upon the aggrieved plaintiff. See Griffin v. Oklahoma Natural Gas
Corp., 132 Kan. 843, 847-52, 297 P. 662, 664-67 (1931); McClelland v. Climax Hosiery
Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 354, 169 N.E. 605, 608 (1930) (Cardozo, C.J., concurring). While
the rule does not deny the plaintiff his claim against the breaching party, it reduces his
recovery to the extent of any damages flowing from consequences he could have avoided.
See id. The plaintiff suffers this ensuing loss, however, through his own choice not to
avoid these damages. See id. at 358-59, 169 N.E. at 609-10. The rule does not violate the
sanctity of contract because it is applied after the breach and requires only reasonable
efforts by the plaintiff. See id.
4. See supra note 3.
5. Compare Ruston v. Centennial Real Estate & Inv. Co., 166 Colo. 377, 380-81, 445
P.2d 64, 66 (1968) (avoidable consequence rule inapplicable pursuant to lease provision)
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through judicial decisions as well as legislative enactments.6
Some jurisdictions refuse to apply the avoidable consequence rule to
the residential leasehold agreement7 because, in accordance with com-
mon law principles, they classify a leasehold agreement as a conveyance
of land.8 These jurisdictions equate the lease with the transfer of a prop-
erty interest in the owner's estate,9 in effect making the tenant the owner
of the leasehold estate for the term of the lease.10 The tenant's right to
possession of the premises is enforced as though the tenant has a prop-
and Simons v. Federal Bar Bldg. Corp., 275 A.2d 545 (D.C. 1971) (avoidable conse-
quence rule inapplicable) and Carpenter v. Riddle, 527 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1974) (same) with
Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968) (avoidable consequence rule applies)
and Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977) (same) and Weinstein v. Griffin,
241 N.C. 161, 84 S.E.2d 549 (1954) (same). See generally Restatement (Second) of Prop-
erty § 12.1 reporters note 8 (1977).
6. See cases and statutes cited infra note 15.
7. This Note addresses only a residential tenant's abandonment of a leasehold agree-
ment and does not address the issue in the commercial context. The Note focuses on the
modem urban landlord-tenant relationship. Some of the arguments in Part II may not
apply to less populated, rural communities.
8. See infra notes 19-52 and accompanying text (discussing the conveyance theory).
For a comprehensive overview of this theory see Weissenberger, The Landlord's Duty to
Mitigate Damages on the Tenant's Abandonment: A Survey of Old Law and New Trends,
53 Temp. L.Q. 1 (1980). As Weissenberger notes, twenty-five jurisdictions refuse to ap-
ply the avoidable consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement. See id. at 7;
see, e.g., Schuisler & Donnell v. Ames, 16 Ala. 73 (1849); Grayson v. Mixon, 176 Ark.
1123, 5 S.W.2d 312 (1928); Ruston v. Centennial Real Estate & Inv. Co., 166 Colo. 377,
445 P.2d 64 (1968); Simons v. Federal Bar Bldg. Corp., 275 A.2d 545, 550 (D.C. 1971);
Kanter v. Safran, 68 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 82 So. 2d 508 (Fla.
1955); Love v. McDevitt, 114 Ga. App. 734, 152 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1966); De Winer v.
Nelson, 54 Idaho 560, 33 P.2d 356 (1934); Jordon v. Nickell, 253 S.W.2d 237, 238-39
(Ky. 1952); D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Blakeley Floor Covering, Inc., 266 So. 2d 925 (La.
Ct. App.), writ denied, 263 La. 615, 268 So. 2d 676 (1972); Enoch C. Richards Co. v.
Libby, 136 Me. 376, 378, 10 A.2d 609, 610 (1940); Cassidy v. Welsh, 319 Mass. 615, 67
N.E.2d 226 (1946); Huntington v. Parkhurst, 87 Mich. 38, 48, 49 N.W. 597, 600 (1891);
Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs. Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956); Al-
sup v. Banks, 68 Miss. 664, 668, 9 So. 895, 895 (1891); Rhoden Inv. Co. v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 499 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. 1973); Wein v. Arlen's, Inc., 98 N.H. 487, 103 A.2d 86
(1954); Heighes v. Porterfield, 28 N.M. 445, 214 P. 323 (1923); Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y.
518, 520 (1876); Carpenter v. Riddle, 527 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1974); Ralph v. Deiley, 293 Pa.
90, 141 A. 640 (1928); Durfee v. United Stores, 24 R.I. 254, 52 A. 1087 (1902); Maida v.
Main Bldg., 473 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Mariani Air Prods. Co. v. Gill's Tire
Mkt., 29 Utah 2d 291, 508 P.2d 808 (1973); Barlow v. Wainwright, 22 Vt. 88, 91-92
(1849); Crowder v. Virginian Bank of Commerce, 127 Va. 299, 103 S.E. 578 (1920);
Arbenz v. Exley, Watkins & Co., 52 W. Va. 476, 44 S.E. 149 (1903). See generally,
Weissenberger, supra at 7, n.31.
These courts base their decisions on the common law conveyance theory. See, e.g.,
Simons v. Federal Bar Bldg. Corp., 275 A.2d 545, 550 (D.C. 1971); Jordon v. Nickell,
253 S.W.2d 237, 238-39 (Ky. 1952); Huntington v. Parkhurst, 87 Mich. 38, 48, 49 N.W.
597, 600 (1891); Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518, 520 (1876).
9. See cases cited supra note 8; see also infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
See generally Sommer, 74 N.J. at 452-54, 378 A.2d at 770-71 (1977) (applying avoidable
consequence rule but discussing the rationale of courts that do not); W. Burby, Real
Property § 43, at 111 (1979).
10. See cases cited supra note 8; see also infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
See generally MAR-SON, Inc. v. Terwaho Enters., Inc., 259 N.W.2d 289, 291 (N.D.
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erty right in the premises for the period of the leasehold agreement."'
Under this view, the avoidable consequence rule does not apply because
"the lessor need not concern himself with the lessee's abandonment of
the lessee's own property." 2 The landlord's refusal to accept what is in
effect the tenant's rescission of his lease places responsibility for all rents
upon the tenant,13 who still holds the lease for the remainder of the
term. 4
Other jurisdictions reject this common law conveyance theory. They
view the leasehold agreement as a contract for goods and services.' 5
Thus, the avoidable consequence rule, as a contract theory, applies to the
1977) (applying the avoidable consequence rule but giving the rationale of courts that do
not); W. Burby, supra note 10, at 111 (1979).
11. See, eg., Camalier & Buckley-Madison, Inc. v. Madison Hotel, Inc., 513 F.2d
407, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 319, 180 A. 464,
465 (1935); Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 470-72, 329 A.2d
812, 822-23 (1974).
12. MAR-SON, Inc., 259 N.W.2d at 291. Since the tenant has exclusive control over
the premises, the landlord may be violating the landlord-tenant relationship if he reenters
and relets the apartment. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
13. See Sancourt Realty v. Dowling, 220 A.D. 660, 660, 222 N.Y.S. 288, 289 (1st
Dep't 1927) (" 'IThe lessor is not required to lease to another if he have an opportunity.'
... Rent is a fixed compensation for a vested interest..., and the tenant's obligation to
pay rent as compensation for the estate is absolute." (citations omitted)); see also infra
notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text (discussing the contractual theory).
See generally Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 Baylor L. Rev.
443 (1972). According to Weissenberger, by 1980 twenty states imposed a duty on resi-
dential landlords to minimize damages. See Weissenberger, supra note 8, at 8. Currently
twenty-three jurisdictions apply the avoidable consequence rule to the leasehold agree-
ment as justified by contractual principles. Six states have adopted the rule through judi-
cial decisions. See West Side Auction House Co. v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
186 Ill. 156, 160-01, 57 N.E. 839, 841 (1900); Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538
(Iowa 1968); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 449, 454-56, 378 A.2d 767, 769, 772-73
(1977); Weinstein v. Griffin, 241 N.C. 161, 84 S.E.2d 549 (1954); Burkhalter v. Town-
send, 139 S.C. 324, 138 S.E. 34 (1927); Goodwin v. The Upper Crust of Wyoming, Inc.,
624 P.2d 1192 (Wyo. 1981).
Seventeen states have adopted the rule through statute. See Alaska Stat. § 34.03.230
(1985); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-1370(c) (1988 Supp.); Cal. Civ. Code § 1951.2 (West
1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-1l(a) (1988 Supp.); Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 5508 (1975);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 521-70 (1985); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-2565 (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 383.670 (Supp. 1988) (limited to specific counties); Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. § 8-207
(1988); Mont. Code Ann. § 70-24-426 (1987); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-1432 (1976); Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118.175 (Michie 1986); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 47-16-13.4 to .5 (1978);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 91-825(3) (1983); Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-28-507 (1982) (limited to spe-
cific counties); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 59.18.310 (1989); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 704.29
(1981). It should be noted, however, that the Tennessee statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-
28-102(a) (1982) applies only in counties with populations over 200,000.
The law in Indiana and Ohio is unsettled on the issue. Compare Hirsch v. Merchants
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 336 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (applying the avoida-
ble consequence rule) and Stern v. Taft, 49 Ohio App. 2d 405, 361 N.E.2d 279, 281
(1976) (same) with Patterson v. Emerick, 21 Ind. App. 614, 52 N.E. 1012 (1899) (not
applying the avoidable consequence rule) and White v. Smith, 8 Ohio App. 368 (1917)
(same). See generally, Weissenberger, supra note 8, at 8 n.32.
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abandonment of the leased premises by a residential tenant. This re-
quires the landlord to avoid any unnecessary accumulation of damages 6
by using reasonable efforts 17 to secure an alternative tenant upon the
original tenant's abandonment. 18
16. See, e.g., West Side Auction House Co. v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186
Ill. 156, 161, 57 N.E. 839, 841 (1900); Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa
1968); Sommer v. Kridel, .74 N.J. 446, 453, 378 A.2d 767, 770-71 (1977); Weinstein v.
Griffin, 241 N.C. 161, 84 S.E.2d 549, 552 (1954); Burkhalter v. Townsend, 139 S.C. 324,
138 S.E. 34, 37 (1927); Goodwin v. The Upper Crust of Wyoming, Inc., 624 P.2d 1192
(Wyo. 1981); see also infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Iowa 1968); Sommer, 74
N.J. at 457, 378 A.2d at 773 (1977). In doing so, the rent received from the new tenant is
applied against the rent due from the defaulting tenant under the breached agreement,
thereby minimizing the damages suffered by the landlord. See Vawter, 159 N.W.2d at
542; Sommer, 74 N.J. at 457, 378 A.2d at 773.
The controversy over the classification of the leasehold agreement is highlighted by the
present confusion among New York courts regarding the application of the avoidable
consequence rule to residential leasehold agreements. Compare Centurian Dev. Ltd. v.
Kenford Co., 60 A.D.2d 96, 98, 400 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264 (4th Dep't 1977) (refusing to
apply the avoidable consequence rule) with Howard Stores Corp. v. Robison Rayon Co.,
36 A.D.2d 911, 912, 320 N.Y.S.2d 861, 862 (1st Dep't 1971) (mem.), aff'g 64 Misc. 2d
913 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (applying the avoidable consequence rule in reliance on landlord's
failure to act in good faith) and 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71
Misc. 2d 353, 355, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873-74 (Sup. Ct. 1972), leave to app. denied,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1972, at 2, col. 4 (Ist Dep't) (lease is a contract and all contractual
principles should apply); see also Parkword Realty Co. v. Marcano, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 692,
353 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1974); Gracie Town House v. Weinstein, N.Y.L.J.,
March 14, 1973, at 17, col. 4 (App. Term); New York Univ. v. Nieto, N.Y.L.J., April 13,
1973, at 18, col. 4 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.); Sherman Taylor Corp. v. Cohen, N.Y.L.J., July 10,
1973, at 10, col. 8 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.).
In an 1876 decision that is still controlling today, the New York Court of Appeals held
that an oral agreement to lease a house in the future is valid and obligatory and vests a
present interest in the term of the lease. See Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518 (1876). Accord-
ingly, the leasehold agreement is not a contract subject to the avoidable consequence rule
and the landlord need not minimize the damages resulting from the tenant's breach of the
agreement. See Sancourt Realty Corp. v. Dowling, 220 A.D. 660, 661, 222 N.Y.S. 288,
289 (1st Dep't 1927). The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, relying on the con-
veyance theory set out in Becar, refuses to apply the avoidable consequence rule to the
landlord-tenant relationship. See Centurian Dev. Ltd. v. Kenford Co., 60 A.D.2d 96, 400
N.Y.S.2d 263 (4th Dep't 1977); accord Spohn v. Fine, 124 Misc. 2d 1075, 1076, 479
N.Y.S.2d 139, 140 (Yates County Ct. 1984); Building Supervision Corp. v. Skolinsky, 50
Misc. 2d 375, 378, 270 N.Y.S.2d 454, 457 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966); Bedford Myrtle Corp.
v. Martin, 28 Misc. 2d 33, 33-34, 209 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Marshak v.
Loewe, 20 Misc. 2d 889, 890, 195 N.Y.S.2d 697, 698 (Sup. Ct. 1959); 59 Madison Ave.
Corp. v. Bauer, 15 Misc. 2d 780, 781-82, 180 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1015-16 (Bronx Mun. Ct.
1958). The First Department, however, accepts the modem view of the lease as a con-
tract and applies the avoidable consequence rule to a breach of a residential leasehold
agreement. See Howard Stores Corp. v. Robison Rayon Co., 36 A.D.2d 911, 912, 320
N.Y.S.2d 861, 862 (1st Dep't 1971) (mem.), aff'g 64 Misc. 2d 913 (Sup. Ct. 1970); 57 E.
54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 355, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872,
873-74 (Sup. Ct. 1972), leave to app. denied, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 1972, at 2, col. 4 (1st
Dep't); see also Parkwood Realty Co. v. Marcano, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 692, 353 N.Y.S.2d
623, 626-27 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1974); Gracie Town House v. Weinstein, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 14,
1973, at 17, col. 4 (App. Term); New York Univ. v. Nieto, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 1973, at 18,
col. 4 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.); Sherman Taylor Corp. v. Cohen, N.Y.L.J., July 10, 1973, at 10,
AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCE RULE
This Note argues that the avoidable consequence rule should apply to
residential leasehold agreements. Part I examines the controversy con-
cerning the classification of leases of residential real property as either a
conveyance of land or a contract, and concludes that contractual princi-
ples mandate application of the avoidable consequence rule to residential
leasehold agreements. Part II analyzes policy reasons supporting appli-
cation of the avoidable consequence rule to residential leasehold agree-
ments. This Note concludes that the avoidable consequence rule should
be applied to residential leasehold agreements. It also recommends that
the issue is best resolved by statute, which affords more precision and
uniformity.
I. THE RESIDENTIAL LEASE: CONVEYANCE OR CONTRACT?
A. Conveyance View
According to the common law conception of residential leases, the
leasehold agreement constitutes a conveyance of real property from the
landlord to the tenant.19 Under this conveyance theory, the landlord
conveys his possessory interest in the land to the tenant for the entire
duration of the leasehold agreement.20 In effect, the tenant's rights to the
land under the leasehold agreement are just as complete as those of the
owner of the estate.21 Consequently, upon execution of the leasehold
col. 8 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.). Although according to Becar New York remains a non-mitiga-
tion state, a significant number of New York lower courts follow the contractual ap-
proach, applying the avoidable consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement.
See, e.g., Paragon Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 122 Misc. 2d 628, 629-30, 473 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93
(App. Term 1983); New York Univ. v. Nieto, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 13, 1973, at 18, col. 4(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.); Gracie Towne House v. Weinstein, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 14, 1973, at 17, col.
4 (App. Term).
Some courts avoid the issue. In Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1976), the trial court held that the tenant would not be liable for rent
due because the landlord did not make a reasonable effort to relet the premises. On
appeal, however, the court avoided the issue by holding that the landlord did make a
reasonable effort to find an alternative tenant, obviating the need to decide whether the
landlord must assume this duty. See Lefrak v. Lambert, 93 Misc. 2d 632, 633, 403
N.Y.S.2d 397, 398 (App. Term 1978) (mem.); see, e.g., Goldman v. Orange County
Chapter, New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children, 121 A.D. 2d 683, 685, 503
N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (2d Dep't 1986); Gabin v. Goldstein, 131 Misc. 2d 153, 155, 497
N.Y.S.2d 984, 986 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1986); Birchwood Assocs. v. Stem, 88 Misc. 2d 937,
938, 390 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (App. Term 1976).
19. See, eg., Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 319, 180 A. 464, 465 (1935);
Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518, 520 (1876).
20. The tenant becomes a limited owner of the landlord's estate for the duration of
the leasehold agreement. See, e.g., Sagamore Corp., 120 Conn. at 319, 180 A. at 465;
Gruman v. Investors Diversified Serv., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377, 380 (1956); Becar
v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518, 520 (1876); MAR-SON, Inc. v. Terwaho Enters., Inc., 259
N.W.2d 289, 291 (N.D. 1977) (citing Gruman); Commonwealth v. Monumental Proper-
ties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 470-74, 329 A.2d 812, 822-24 (1974). See generally R. Cunning-
ham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of Property, § 6.1 at 256 (1984 ed.) (tenant
holds a possessory estate in the land).
21. See Baker v. Clifford-Matthew Inv. Co., 99 Fla. 1229, 1232, 128 So. 827, 829
(1930); Gruman, 247 Minn. at 502, 78 N.W.2d at 380; MAR-SON, Inc. v. Terwaho
19881
430 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
agreement, the landlord relinquishes his possessory interest in the land
for the term of the lease22 and must avoid any act of dominion over the
premises until the lease expires.23
Because the landlord grants the tenant the equivalent of an estate for
years, he owes the tenant few obligations during the term of the lease.24
However, limited duties do exist between the landlord and the tenant.
For example, the landlord must deliver possession of the premises25 and
protect the tenant in his quiet enjoyment 26 of the premises.27 The ten-
ant's duties to the landlord consist of refraining from disturbing other
tenants,28 making ordinary repairs in the absence of a covenant to the
contrary, 9 and not committing waste.30 Other than these limited duties,
the landlord and tenant maintain a relationship essentially divorced from
each other.31
Enters., Inc., 259 N.W.2d 289, 291 (N.D. 1977); Humbach, supra note 2, at 1213-90; see
also In Re Dant & Dant, 39 F. Supp. 753, 758 (W.D. Ky. 1941), (it is as if the "lessee has
purchased an interest in the real estate."), aff'd sub nom. Kessler v. Jefferson Storage
Corp., 125 F.2d 108 (6th Cir. 1941).
22. See MAR-SON, Inc., 259 N.W.2d at 291 (N.D. 1977); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J.
446, 454, 378 A.2d 767, 771 (1977).
23. See Sommer, 74 N.J.,at 454, 378 A.2d at 771.
24. See generally, R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, supra note 20, § 6.1,
at 256 (tenant has a possessory interest while landlord retains a greater interest in
reversion).
25. The tenant has a legal right to the land and the landlord is responsible for dam-
ages resulting when the tenant is prevented from taking possession of the land. See Boltz
v. Crawford & North Ayes. Theatre Co., 294 Ill. App. 258, 261-62, 13 N.E.2d 844, 846
(1938).
26. The tenant's right to quiet enjoyment of the premises affords him protection
against wrongful acts by the landlord. See Milheim v. Baxter, 46 Colo. 155, 103 P. 376,
377-78 (1909); Winchester v. O'Brien, 266 Mass. 33, 37-38, 164 N.E. 807, 809 (1929);
Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N.W. 255, 258-59 (1926).
27. However, at common law there was no implied duty on the part of a landlord to
put the premises in repair. See Welson v. Neujan Bldg. Corp., 264 N.Y. 303, 305, 190
N.E. 648, 649 (1934); Widmor v. Healey, 247 N.Y. 94, 96, 159 N.E. 874, 874 (1928);
Edwards v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R. Co., 98 N.Y. 245, 247 (1885); Fermaglich v. War-
shawiak, 42 Misc. 2d 1077, 1079, 249 N.Y.S.2d 963, 966 (Rockland Co. Ct. 1964). The
tenant, therefore, must bear the risk of the condition of the premises at the commence-
ment of the lease and must repair defects in the premises existing at the time he takes
possession barring any expressed covenants to the contrary. See Franklin v. Brown, 118
N.Y. 110, 115, 23 N.E. 126, 127 (1889); Kosior v. Pomrinse, 249 A.D. 196, 197, 291
N.Y.S. 830, 831 (1st Dep't 1936).
28. See Louisiana Leasing Co. v. Sokolow, 48 Misc. 2d 1014, 266 N.Y.S.2d 447
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1966).
29. See King v. Cooney-Eckstein Co., 66 Fla. 246, 63 So. 659, 660 (1913); Suydam v.
Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450, 453-54 (1873). Landlords and tenants often make covenants that
place the obligation to make specific repairs on the landlord. See, eg., Miller v. Miller,
217 Miss. 650, 64 So. 2d 739, 742 (1953) (covenant to keep roof in repair).
30. The tenant is not entitled to use the land in a manner that will diminish the value
of the interests owned by others in the same land. See Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104
Wis. 7, 10, 79 N.W. 738, 739 (1899). For a discussion of what constitutes waste, see
generally W. Burby, Real Property §§ 12-13, at 33-39 (1979).
31. See generally Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d
377 (1956).
AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCE RULE
According to the common law conveyance theory, the landlord's inter-
est in the collection of rent arises from the tenant's ownership of the
leasehold estate 2 and runs from the land itself, rather than from the ten-
ant.3" Conversely, the tenant's obligation to pay rent stems from the
landlord's conveyance of the land to him. The tenant, therefore, is
bound to the rental obligation for as long as he owns the leasehold es-
tate-for the entire term of the leasehold agreement regardless of what
actually happens to the premises.3" When the tenant vacates the prem-
ises, the common law treats this as an abandonment of his own estate and
an offer to rescind the leasehold agreement prior to termination of the
tenant's interest.3 5 The landlord may respond to this offer in one of three
ways.
First, the landlord may simply accept the abandonment and release the
tenant from his leasehold obligations by renting to someone else.3 6 Sec-
ond, the landlord may take no action at all, thereby continuing to hold
the tenant liable for the rent as it becomes due under the terms of the
leasehold agreement. 37 This action comports with the tenant's owner-
ship interest in the leased premises38 because the tenant effectively owns
the land during the stipulated term of the lease.39 The landlord may only
collect rent.'"
Finally, the landlord may exercise the "tenant's account remedy."'"
This entitles the landlord to resume possession of the property for the
limited purpose of reletting it to a new tenant.4 2 The rent received under
the new lease is applied to the defaulting tenant's account.13 The land-
32. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 n.31 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Love, Landlord's Remedies when the Tenant Abandons:
Property, Contract, and Leases, 30 U. Kan. L. Rev. 533, 535 (1982).
33. See Love, supra note 32, at 535 ("[Tlhe rent issued from the land, and.., the land
was bound to pay the rent.")
34. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074; Love, supra note 32, at 535.
35. See Love, supra note 32, at 535.
36. See Weinsklar Realty Co. v. Dooley, 200 Wis. 412, 228 N.W. 515, 517 (1930).
37. See D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Blakeley Floor Covering, Inc., 266 So. 2d 925, 926
(La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 263 La. 615, 268 So. 2d 676 (1972); Eidelman v. Walker &
Dunlop, Inc., 265 Md. 538, 542-43, 290 A.2d 780, 783 (1972); Gruman v. Investors Di-
versified Serv., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377, 379 (1956); Heighes v. Porterfield, 28
N.M. 445, 214 P. 323, 324 (1923).
38. See Love, supra note 32, at 535.
39. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
40. See eg., Becar v. Flues, 64 N.Y. 518, 520 (1876); Commonwealth v. Monumental
Properties, 459 Pa. 450, 470-72, 329 A.2d 812, 822-23 (1974); Love, supra note 36, at
535. However, the landlord and tenant continue to owe some limited duties to each
other. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
41. See Love, supra note 32, at 535; Hayes v. Goldman, 71 Ark. 251, 255, 72 S.W.
563, 564 (1903); Roberts v. Wish, 265 Mass. 179, 181-82, 163 N.E. 892, 893 (1928);
Centurian Dev. Ltd. v. Kenford Co., 60 A.D.2d 96, 98, 400 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264 (4th Dep't
1977); Meagher v. Eilers Music House, 84 Or. 33, 164 P. 373, 375 (1917); Auer v. Penn,
99 Pa. 370, 375-76 (1882).
42. See Hoke v. Williamson, 98 Kan. 580, 582, 158 P. 1115, 1116 (1916); Love, supra
note 32, at 539-40.
43. See Williamson, 98 Kan. at 582, 158 P. at 1116; Love, supra note 32, at 539-40.
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lord's damages from the defaulting tenant then amount to the difference
between the breaching tenant's rent and the new tenant's rent.44 The
original tenant is not released from liability. Although this option re-
mains available to the landlord it is inconsistent with the conveyance
theory because, in essence, the landlord finds a new tenant to place on
someone else's land. 45
Upon his abandonment, the tenant has no control over the landlord's
choice of remedies.46 Although the landlord, through a fiction, has con-
veyed to the tenant, the tenant is only a limited owner of the premises
during the term of the leasehold agreement;47 therefore, the tenant can-
not divest himself of his estate to the landlord's disadvantage through an
act of abandonment.48 The tenant cannot evade liability for the rent by
abandoning the premises before the expiration of the leasehold agree-
ment.49 Consequently, although the landlord owes some limited obliga-
tions to the tenant,50 he otherwise may ignore the granted estate during
the term of the leasehold agreement;51 the landlord need not seek a new
tenant upon abandonment by the original tenant. 2
B. Contract View
Recently, a large body of case law has emerged, forsaking the common
law conveyance theory and treating a lease as a contract between a
merchant and a consumer for goods and services. 3 Under this contrac-
tual theory, the tenant does not receive an ownership interest in the land
44. See, e.g., Williamson, 98 Kan. at 582, 158 P. at 1116; Wilson v. Ruhl, 277 Md.
607, 613, 356 A.2d 544, 548 (1976); Love, supra note 32, at 536-44.
45. See Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 453, 378 A.2d 767, 771 (1977); Wright v.
Baumann, 239 Or. 410, 412-15, 398 P.2d 119, 120-21 (1965); Love, supra note 32, at 535.
46. See Hickman v. Breadford, 179 Iowa 827, 162 N.W. 53, 56-57 (1917).
47. See supra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text.
48. See Bonetti v. Treat, 91 Cal. 223, 27 P. 612, 613-14 (1891); Anheuser-Busch
Brewing Ass'n v. American Prod. Co., 211 P. 817, 818 (Cal. App. 1922) (per curiam).
49. See Browne v. Dugan, 189 Ark. 551, 561, 74 S.W.2d 640, 645 (1934); De Hart v.
Allen, 26 Cal. 2d 829, 832-33, 161 P.2d 453, 455-56 (1945); Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N.Y.
287, 291-92, 31 N.E. 94, 95-96 (1892).
50. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
51. See Gruman v. Investors Diversified Serv., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377, 379-
80 (1956).
52. See Gruman, 247 Minn. at 504, 78 N.W.2d at 379; see also supra notes 13-15.
53. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir.),
cert denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 619, 517 P.2d
1168, 1172-73, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708-09 (1974); Brown v. Southhall Realty Co., 237
A.2d 834, 836-37 (D.C. 1968); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 433, 462 P.2d 470, 474
(1969); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 92-93, 276 A.2d 248, 251-52 (1971); Marini v. Ire-
land, 56 N.J. 130, 141-43, 265 A.2d 526, 532-33 (1970).
Many landlord-tenant statutes also apply contractual principles to leases. See, e.g.,
Alaska Stat. §§ 34.03.160 to .230, .270 (1985); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-1361-1370, -
1373 (1974); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1941.1.-2, 1951.2, 1951.5 (West 1985); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§ 47a-12-15, -12-19, (1988 Supp.); Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, §§ 5112, 5302, 5502, 5505,
5508, 5510 (1988 Supp.); Fla. Stat. §§ 83.05, .54-.57 (1988 Supp.); Or. Rev. Stat.
§§ 91.800-.825, .845 (1984); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 59.18.080-.120, .160, .180, .310
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through the leasehold agreement. Instead he only contracts with the
landlord for a "well known package of goods and services"54 in consider-
ation for his payment of rent."
Courts viewing the lease as a contract reason that the modem tenant is
no longer interested in the land when he enters into a residential lease-
hold agreement, but rather seeks a dwelling place upon the land. 6 Fur-
thermore, the duties between the landlord and tenant consist of those
contracted for in the leasehold agreement.5 " Accordingly, the tenant's
obligation to pay rent stems from the leasehold agreement, not from his
limited ownership of the land. 8
Under the contractual approach, a tenant's abandonment 9 is treated
as a breach,6" and the avoidable consequence rule obligates the landlord
to minimize his damages6" by making reasonable attempts to secure a
substitute tenant.62 Failure to undertake reasonable efforts to secure an
alternative tenant results in a reduced damage recovery for the
landlord.63
The rationale for this contractual approach is grounded in the nature
of today's urban housing market. 64 The conveyance theory is based on
certain assumptions which are no longer valid. The common law con-
veyance theory comports with the nature of an agrarian economy where
(1988 Supp.); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 704.07, .17, .29 (West 1988 Supp.); see also Weis-
senberger, supra note 8, at 2 n.4.
The rationale for this view results from the proliferation of modem urban communi-
ties. The common law conveyance theory of leasing is not practical in urban cities where
tenants rent for a place to live rather than for the land itself. The productivity of the land
is irrelevant and the structure upon the land becomes the focus of the transfer between
the landlord and tenant. Consequently, in urban communities the services and responsi-
bilities that attach to the structure are of profound importance to the transaction. The
landlord can no longer divorce himself from the effects of the transaction. See infra notes
54-77 and accompanying text.
54. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
55. See cases cited infra note 53.
56. As one court reasoned:
The assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal property law,
that a lease primarily conveyed to the tenant an interest in land may have been
reasonable in a rural, agrarian society... [because] the value of the lease to the
tenant [was in] the land itself. But in the case of the modem apartment dweller,
the value of the lease is that it gives him a place to live.
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074; see cases cited supra note 53.
57. The parties to the leasehold agreement contract through specific leasehold cove-
nants for the goods and services they require from each other. See Sommer v. Kridel, 74
N.J. 446, 454-56, 378 A.2d 767, 771-72 (1977) (citing 2 Powell on Real Property,
§ 221[l], at 80-81, (1977 ed.)).
58. See MAR-SON, Inc. v. Terwaho Enters., Inc., 259 N.W.2d 289, 291 (N.D. 1977);
cases cited supra note 53.
59. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 3, 16-18 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 3-4, 16-18 and accompanying text.
64. See cases cited supra note 53.
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the land is more important to a tenant than any structures upon it.65
Today's modem tenant merely seeks a dwelling place and, therefore,
rents for the purpose of obtaining shelter and services from the land-
lord.66 To ensure that landlords provide the essential shelter and services
that the modem tenant seeks,67 landlord-tenant law must abandon the
conveyance theory and instead apply contractual principles to the lease-
hold agreement.6 s
Complexities associated with modem city life69 support the application
of contractual principles to the leasehold agreement. Problems arising
from these complexities are commonly solved with specific leasehold cov-
enants.7° Inclusion of these covenants enables courts to "cast aside tech-
nicalities in the interpretation of leases and to concentrate their attention,
as in the case of other contracts, on the intentions of the parties."'"
Courts also infer contractual duties from the leasehold agreement 72
because tenants generally maintain an inferior bargaining position with
respect to landlords.73 The application of warranties of habitability to
the residential landlord-tenant relationship exemplifies the application of
65. See cases cited supra note 53. Evolving "social factors, [however], have exerted
increasing influence on the law of estate for years," justifying rejection of the application
of the conveyance theory to modem residential leasehold agreements. Sommer v. Kridel,
74 N.J. 446, 454, 378 A.2d 767, 771 (1977) (quoting 2 Powell on Real Property § 221[l],
at 180-81 (1977 ed.)).
66. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); cases cited supra note 53.
67. See infra notes 69, 77 and accompanying text. Applying contract principles to
residential leases will help ensure availability of habitable apartments in markets where
demand for housing exceeds supply. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
68. The common law conveyance theory relieves the landlord of all but a few obliga-
tions to the tenant and cannot achieve the modem purpose of the leasehold agreement.
See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077-80; Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane Holding Co., 24 N.J. 139,
145, 130 A.2d 833, 836-37 (1957).
69. Such complexities include the common everyday needs associated with modem
urban dwelling. The extensive standards set out in housing regulations provide a good
guide for these services. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074 n.9. Examples of such services
associated with general housing regulations are hot water, garbage disposal, see, e.g.,
Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 482, 268 A.2d 556, 559 (1970), and
air conditioning, see, e.g., Park Hill Terrace Assocs. v. Glennon, 146 N.J. Super. 271,
276-77, 369 A.2d 938, 941-42 (1977).
70. See Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 454, 378 A.2d 767, 771 (1977) (quoting 2
Powell on Real Property § 221[1], at 181 (1977 ed.)).
71. Sommer, 74 N.J. at 455, 378 A.2d at 772 (quoting 6 Williston on Contracts
§ 809A, at 592 (3d ed. 1962)). The use of these "specific lease covenants has reintroduced
into the law of estates for years a predominantly contractual ingredient." Id. at 454, 378
A.2d at 771 (quoting 2 Powell on Real Property § 221(1) at 181 (1977 ed.)).
72. See Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 455-56, 378 A.2d 767, 772 (1977); Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 143-144, 265 A.2d 526, 533 (1970).
73. The landlord's superior bargaining position arises from the fact that he owns the
premises and sets the terms of the leasehold agreement. See, eg., Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See
generally Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 202, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
1976). Inequality in bargaining power also results when the demand for habitable resi-
dences exceeds supply. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
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modern contract principles to landlord-tenant law.74 The landlord's obli-
gation to provide the tenant with habitable premises is now an accepted
principle of landlord-tenant law." Courts have also adopted legislative
health regulations in determining the landlord's obligation to the tenant
under the implied warranty of habitability.76 Courts have thus recog-
nized that treating the lease as a contract, rather than as a conveyance,
makes more sense in the modern urban housing market.77
Because the residential leasehold agreement is viewed as a contract
between the landlord and tenant, contractual principles, including the
avoidable consequence rule, should be applicable.78 Courts employ the
avoidable consequence rule in every area of contract law,7 9 including
74. See Johnson, Correctly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant to Modern Con-
tract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 Va. L. Rev. 751, 793 n.131 (1988).
75. Both courts and legislatures now recognize a contractually implied warranty of
habitability in all residential leases, resulting in the landlord's continued duty to maintain
the condition of the premises. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,
629, 517 P.2d 1168, 1176, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 712 (1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw.
426, 433, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280
N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. La-
timer, 214 Kan. 329, 335-36, 521 P.2d 304, 309-10 (1974); Boston Housing Auth. v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 533-34 (1970); Teller v. McCoy, 162 W. Va. 367, 380, 253 S.E.2d
114, 123 (1978); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1988); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 59.18.060 (West Supp. 1989); Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
§ 2.104(a)(2).
76. In general, the cases indicate that any proof of housing code violations having a
substantial adverse impact on health and safety will be sufficient to establish a breach of
the implied warranty of habitability. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10
Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc.
v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972); Boston Housing Auth. v. Hem-
ingway, 363 Mass. 184, 200-01, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843-44 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495
S.W.2d 65, 77-78 (Mo. App. 1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92-93, 276 A.2d 248,
251-52 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469-70, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973); Pugh v.
Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 289-90, 405 A.2d 897, 905-06 (1979); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d
22, 30-31, 515 P.2d 160, 166 (1973). Examples of such housing code violations include
failure to provide hot running water, see, e.g., Winchester Mgmt. Corp. v. Staten, 361
A.2d 187, 189-90 (D.C. 1976); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 291, 405 A.2d 897, 906-07
(1979); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 29, 515 P.2d 160, 165 (1973), garbage disposal
and elevator service, see, e.g., Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 482,
268 A.2d 556, 559 (1970), and, in general, "facilities vital to the use of the premises for
residential purposes," Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 466, 308 A.2d 17, 20 (1973)
(quoting Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970)).
77. The common law conveyance theory imposes few obligations on the landlord.
See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc.
2d 353, 355, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873-74 (Sup. Ct. 1972), leave to app. denied, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 18, 1972 at 2, col. 4 (1st Dep't).
79. See Brown v. Cairns, 63 Kan. 584, 588, 66 P. 639, 640 (1901); Peninsular Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. C.J. Breier Co., 137 Wash. 641, 243 P. 830, 832 (1926); see, e.g., Oakland
Metal Stamping Co. v. Forest Indus., Inc., 352 Mich. 119, 125-26, 89 N.W.2d 503, 506
(1958) (buyer of manufactured goods should have rejected the first lot as defective, thus
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contracts of employment,"° sales contracts,8 ' and even in cases of breach
by anticipatory repudiation. 2 Therefore, it is both logical and consistent
with modem contract principles to apply the avoidable consequence rule
to residential leasehold agreements.8 3
II. POLICY REASONS FOR ADOPTING THE AVOIDABLE
CONSEQUENCE RULE
Although the modem view regards a lease as contractual in nature,
courts are not bound to apply all contractual principles to the leasehold
agreement. Nevertheless, strong policy reasons favor application of the
avoidable consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement.
A. Economic Efficiency
Public policy and theories of economic efficiency encourage putting
property to its most productive use. This goal is furthered by applying
the avoidable consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement. 84
Under the conveyance fiction, when a residential tenant abandons an
apartment the landlord may stand idle and collect the full rent as, or
after, it accrues, 5 leaving the abandoned apartment vacant for the dura-
tion of the breached leasehold agreement. Failure to impose the avoida-
ble consequence rule fosters this inefficient use of residential property.
The landlord will be assured of a full recovery in the event of litigation.
He therefore has little or no incentive to relet the abandoned apart-
ment. 6 Expenditure of time, effort, and money, such as the cost of ad-
avoiding any damages incurred later); Johnson v. General Mutual Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d
42, 49, 246 N.E.2d 713, 717, 298 N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 (1969) (insured must try to obtain
substitute insurance when original insurer wrongfully cancels his policy).
80. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982); Soules v. In-
dependent School Dist. No. 518, 258 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn. 1977).
81. See, eg., Karlen v. Butler Mfg. Co., 526 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1975); Lewis v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 508 (8th Cir. 1971); Fraser-Smith Co. v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 435 F.2d 1396, 1399 (8th Cir. 1971); Cargill, Inc. v. S/S
Nasugbu, 404 F. Supp. 342, 348 (M.D. La. 1975). See generally U.C.C. § 2-715(2).
82. See, e.g., Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v. Krow, 40 F.2d 488, 492-93 (10th Cir.
1930); Cameron v. White, 74 Wis. 425, 431-32, 43 N.W. 155, 157 (1889).
83. See Riverview Realty Co. v. Perosio, 138 N.J. Super. 270, 273-74, 350 A.2d 517,
519 (App. Div. 1976) ("there is no sound reason for a continuation of a special real
property rule to the issue of mitigation"), rev'd, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977) (apply-
ing avoidable consequence rule). See generally S. Corbin, Contracts § 1039(a) (1984
Supp. Part II).
84. See Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 456-57, 378 A.2d 767, 772 (1977); Riverview
Realty Co. v. Perosio, 138 N.J. Super. 270, 273-74, 350 A.2d 517, 519 (App. Div. 1976),
rev'd, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977) (applying avoidable consequence rule); MAR-
SON, Inc. v. Terwaho Enters., Inc., 259 N.W.2d 289, 291 (N.D. 1977); Martin v. Siegley,
123 Wash. 683, 684-85, 212 P. 1057, 1058-59 (1923).
85. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
86. See generally cases cited supra note 84. However, some incentive to act may be
provided if the landlord fears that he will be unable to collect a judgment rendered in his
favor. Additional incentive may be provided if the housing market will tolerate a higher
rent to a new tenant.
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vertising, in securing an alternative tenant becomes an unnecessary
burden. s7 Because the landlord may withhold a valuable commodity
from the economy, 8 an important community resource goes underutil-
ized. 9 Ultimately, the public pays for this inefficiency because it forces a
dissipation of private resources to replace the loss.9 0 Withholding habita-
ble apartments from the housing market may increase the existing hous-
ing shortages in urban areas,91 resulting in the need to develop additional
low-income housing.
Application of the avoidable consequence rule eliminates underutiliza-
tion of residential space. Upon the tenant's abandonment, the landlord
must avoid any unnecessary accumulation of damages and must make
reasonable attempts to secure an alternative tenant. 2 This assures the
availability of the abandoned premises. The measure of minimized dam-
ages available to the landlord93 avoids economic waste,94 while allowing
the landlord to maintain the economic position guaranteed by the origi-
nal tenant's lease. A rule "designed not only to prevent and repair indi-
vidual loss and injustice, but also to protect and conserve the economic
welfare and prosperity of the whole community,"95 is an efficient rule
that should be applied.
Applying the avoidable consequence rule to the leasehold agreement
also comports with the efficient breach theory of contract law.96 Under
the theory of efficient breach, the breach should result in an overall, effi-
cient "pareto optimum" state whereby the aggrieved landlord is no worse
off than he was under the existing leasehold agreement, and the breach-
ing tenant is in the same or better position than he was under the original
87. See generally cases cited supra note 84.
88. See Riverview, at 138 N.J. Super. 273-74, 350 A.2d at 519.
89. See id; see also McCormick, The Rights of the Landlord Upon Abandonment of
the Premises by the Tenant, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 211, 221-22 (1925).
90. See McCormick, supra note 89, at 221-22.
91. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1987, at B1, col. 5.
92. See supra notes 3-4, 16-18 and accompanying text.
93. The avoidable consequence rule limits the landlord's recovery for the breach of
the leasehold agreement to the difference between the rent received from the new tenant
and the rent received under the breached agreement. See supra note 18.
94. There is no single rule eliciting the efficiency of this policy, but public policy
favors a rule that limits recovery to a measurement based upon minimized damages. Cf.
Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 242-44, 129 N.E. 889, 890-91 (1921). In
Jacobs & Youngs it was held that, if a contractor uses a brand of materials in building a
house other than the brand specified in the contract, the measure of damages is the
amount by which the contract breach has diminished the value of the house, not the cost
of tearing down the house and rebuilding it correctly. See id. at 244-45, 129 N.E. at 891-
92. Such decisions by courts incorporate the basic idea that economic waste should be
avoided and that damages should be minimized by applying the avoidable consequence
rule.
95. C. McCormick, Damages, § 125 (1935).
96. See generally Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82
Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1394-97 (1982). An efficient breach of contract is one which results
in a net societal gain without economically harming the aggrieved party to the contract.
See id.
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agreement.9 7 Application of the avoidable consequence rule to the aban-
donment of residential premises fosters this pareto optimum state be-
cause the landlord reoccupies his vacant apartment without suffering any
detriment,98 while the tenant obtains a better living situation, the pre-
sumable reason for his breach.
The avoidable consequence rule further promotes an efficient result by
allowing the landlord, in effect, to cover for the tenant's breach of the
leasehold agreement.99 The landlord occupies a better position than the
tenant to cover for the tenant's breach because, in general, he will incur
much lower costs."° The landlord is in the business of renting property
and usually has business relationships which make his cover costs, such
as advertising, much cheaper.10 1 Furthermore, if the breaching tenant
relocates somewhere far from the landlord's apartment, it will be virtu-
ally impossible for him to find a new tenant.I12 Moreover, the landlord
obviously knows more than the tenant about his own special needs in
securing a replacement tenant. 103
Last, angry landlords may seek vengeance 1  by refusing to accept a
suitable alternative tenant merely because of their personal dislike of the
original breaching tenant.10 5 Applying the avoidable consequence rule
prevents such spiteful actions because the rational landlord will more
likely examine his motives for vengeance if his ultimate monetary recov-
ery will be reduced by such unproductive conduct. 106
97. Cf. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985)
(a pareto optimum breach results in a "net societal gain"); Yorio, supra note 96 at 1394,
n. 150 ("if one person's situation can be improved without causing a loss to anyone else, a
clear societal gain will occur, resulting in a 'pareto improvement' over the old."). See
generally J. Hirshliefer, Price Theory and Application (3d ed. 1980); R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of the Law (2d ed. 1977).
98. See supra note 18.
99. See id.
100. Cf Yorio, supra note 96, at 1384-85 (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller
in a sales contract). This position is further justified by the fact that tenants usually
occupy a bargaining position greatly inferior to that of landlords. See Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970);
Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 202, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1976);
supra note 72 and accompanying text. Landlords typically have more resources available
to secure an alternative tenant than does the breaching tenant. Cf. Sommer v. Kridel, 74
N.J. 446, 456, 378 A.2d 767, 772 (1977) (landlord is in better position to demonstrate
whether he exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to relet the premises).
101. Cf Yorio, supra note 96, at 1384 (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller in a
sales contract).
102. Cf. id. (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller in a sales contract).
103. Cf. id. (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller in a sales contract).
104. Cf. id. at 1384-85 (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller in a sales contract).
105. Cf. id. at 1385-86 (drawing an analogy to the buyer and seller in a sales contract).
106. Cf. In Re Estate of Pace, 93 Misc. 2d 969, 974, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (Sur. Ct.
1977) ("[A]lthough a person may wish to deal capriciously with his property .... his self-
interest will usually prevent him from doing so.").
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B. Rejection of Traditional No-Mitigation Approach
In addition to promoting efficient results, applying the avoidable con-
sequence rule also produces the more equitable result for the tenant. 107
Because the landlord maintains a better bargaining position than the ten-
ant,10 8 as a "matter of basic fairness"109 the landlord should make a rea-
sonable attempt to cover the tenant's breach. Requiring the tenant to
pay for his breach when an acceptable, alternate tenant is available is
unduly punitive. 110 Unfortunately, the no mitigation rule is often ratio-
nalized with traditional legal principles. The remainder of this Note ex-
amines these principles and concludes that they do not logically support
a no mitigation rule.
A traditional argument raised against the application of the avoidable
consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement asserts that re-
quiring the landlord to minimize his damages by attempting to secure a
replacement tenant upon the original tenant's abandonment requires the
landlord to alter or increase his obligation under the original leasehold
agreement. 11  This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it
is incorrect to interpret the avoidable consequence rule as placing an af-
107. See Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 456-57, 378 A.2d 767, 773 (1977). But see
Browne v. Dugan, 189 Ark. 551, 561, 74 S.W.2d 640, 645 (1934) (breaching tenant, as
wrongdoer, should not profit from his malfeasance).
108. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
109. Sommer, 74 N.J. at 456, 378 A.2d at 772. Although a reasonable tenant might
attempt to mitigate his own damages by bringing in an alternative tenant, the inequity in
the ability to do this indicates that the duty to mitigate should fall upon the landlord.
110. In Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977), the landlord waited
fifteen months and allowed $4,658.50 in damages to accrue before attempting to relet the
apartment. See id. at 457, 378 A.2d at 773. Despite the availability of a tenant who was
ready, willing, and able to rent the apartment, the landlord needlessly increased his dam-
ages by turning her away.. See id. There was no showing by the landlord that the alterna-
tive tenant was not a suitable one. See id. at 458, 378 A.2d at 773.
"[Tihe logic... which permits the landlord to stand idly by the vacant, abandoned
premises and treat them as property of the tenant and recover full rent, [must] yield to
more realistic notions of social advantage which in other fields of law have forbidden a
recovery for damages which the plaintiff by reasonable efforts could have avoided." Id. at
456, 378 A.2d at 772 (quoting McCormick, supra note 89, at 221-22). See generally
Kaufman, The Scientific Method in Legal Thought: Legal Realism and the Fourteen Prin-
ciples of Justice, 12 St. Mary's L.J. 77, 96-97 (1980).
111. See Wohl v. Yelen, 22 Ill. App. 2d 455, 464, 161 N.E.2d 339, 343 (1959). It has
also been argued, in some jurisdictions, that an attempt to mitigate damages may be
construed as an automatic termination of the leasehold agreement when the tenant is not
in possession of the premises. Such agreements are called survival of liability clauses. See
Rosenfeld v. Aaron, 248 N.Y. 437, 442, 162 N.E. 478, 479 (1928) ("Survivorship
Clause"); Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N.Y. 381, 390, 62 N.E. 425, 427 (1902) ("covenant to
pay, with no right to enjoy"). See generally J. Rosch, New York Landlord & Tenant
Summary Proceedings § 785, at 236 (2d ed. 1971). As such, the landlord will lose all
rights to damages from the tenant. However, this does not justify a no mitigation rule
because in these jurisdictions the landlord and tenant may agree that the tenant will be
liable for the duration of the leasehold agreement even though the tenant is out of posses-
sion. See International Publication, Inc. v. Matchabelli, 260 N.Y. 451, 454, 184 N.E. 51,
52 (1933).
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firmative duty upon the landlord."1 2 The landlord need not act, and may
still hold the breaching tenant liable." 3 By doing so, however, he may
receive a reduced recovery.11 4 The reduction in the landlord's recovery
does not result from the tenant's malfeasance, but rather from the land-
lord's own failure to minimize damages." 5 Second, this argument fails
to explain why a landlord should be treated differently from any other
party against whom a contractual breach has been committed.' 16 It is a
general principle of law that an injured party is prohibited from recover-
ing damages for harm suffered if he could have taken reasonable steps to
prevent such harm. 1 1
7
Another argument against applying the avoidable consequence rule to
the leasehold agreement is that the landlord-tenant relationship is per-
sonal. 1 To require the landlord to seek a substitute tenant may compel
him to accept, in a personal relationship, a party with whom he does not
wish to conduct business.' 19 This argument is flawed, however, because
the avoidable consequence rule does not require a landlord to relet to any
replacement tenant. The rule merely requires objectively reasonable ef-
forts on the part of the plaintiff to minimize his damages.' 20 Such objec-
tive reasonable efforts need not be successful. 121
Moreover, courts apply the avoidable consequence rule in employment
contracts, which are more personal in nature than leases. 122 A wrong-
fully discharged employee under an employment contract must attempt
to minimize his damages by seeking employment elsewhere. In applying
the avoidable consequence rule in the employment context, courts have
adopted an objective test in determining the extent of the employee's ob-
112. See supra note 3.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See Riverview Realty Co. v. Perosio, 138 N.J. Super. 270, 273-74, 350 A.2d 517,
519 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977) (applying avoidable conse-
quence rule).
117. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
118. Cf. Wohl v. Yelen, 22 Ill. App. 2d 455, 464, 161 N.E.2d 339, 343 (1959) (mitiga-
tion required even in employment contracts, where personal element is even more
important).
119. See id.
120. The avoidable consequence rule is based on the unreasonableness of the non-
breaching party's actions. See 5 A. Corbin, Contracts, § 1039 (1964). It does not force
the landlord to accept an alternative tenant who is not a suitable substitute. See infra
notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
121. See Ninth Ave. & Forty-Second St. Corp. v. Zimmerman, 217 A.D. 498, 500, 217
N.Y.S. 123, 125 (1st Dep't 1926). These efforts need not involve unreasonable expenses,
cf. Taylor v. Steadman, 143 Ark. 486, 220 S.W. 821, 823 (1920) (party whose property
was flooded by neighbor's diversion of water from a creek need only expend reasonable
effort and expense to mitigate his damages); Chambers v. Belmore Land & Water Co., 33
Cal. App. 78, 80, 164 P. 404, 406 (1917), nor jeopardize the landlord's credit rating, see
Audiger, Inc. v. Town of Hamilton, 381 F.2d 24, 25 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
122. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982); Soules v. In-
dependent School Dist. No. 518, 258 N.W.2d 103, 105-06 (Minn. 1977).
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ligation to seek alternative employment. 123 The discharged employee
need not minimize his damages by accepting employment in a different
position or on different terms, 124 employment at a lesser rank, 125 at a
reduced salary, 126 or at a location unreasonably distant from his former
place of employment.127
Courts may easily adapt a similar test to the landlord-tenant relation-
ship. The landlord need not relet to a tenant who will use the premises
for a substantially different purpose than that contemplated in the origi-
nal lease. 128 Nor must the landlord alter or increase his obligations in
order to secure a replacement tenant.1 29  Objective factors such as
whether the tenant is financially ready, willing and able to comply with
the terms of the breaching tenant's agreement help determine the alterna-
tive tenant's suitability.13 0 Moreover, the landlord need only expend rea-
123. See cases cited supra note 122; see also infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
124. See, eg., American Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 F. 774, 783 (9th Cir. 1921) (chief
accountant need not accept position as bookkeeper); Billetter v. Posell, 94 Cal. App. 2d
858, 211 P.2d 621, 623 (1949) (employee not required to accept re-employment in mitiga-
tion of damages if new employment would bring lower salary or would sacrifice em-
ployee's rights to damages under original contract); San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Collins,
61 S.W.2d 84, 89 (Tex. App. 1933) (wrongfully discharged railroad employee not re-
quired to accept work which is not of substantially same status, capacity or grade as
previous position).
125. See, eg., Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 182-83, 474
P.2d 689, 692-93, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740-41 (1970) (actress engaged as lead in a musical
film need not accept a substitute role as lead in a western film); Cooper v. Stronge &
Warner Co., 111 Minn. 177, 126 N.W. 541 (1910) (department manager need not accept
a position as a sales clerk for the same salary).
126. See, e.g., State ex rel. Freeman v. Sierra County Bd. of Educ., 49 N.M. 54, 157
P.2d 234 (1945) (principal need not accept a job as a teacher for a reduced salary).
127. See, e.g., American Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 F. 774, 783 (9th Cir. 1921) (resi-
dent of China hired in the Orient need not seek employment in the United States); San
Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Collins, 61 S.W.2d 84, 89 (Tex. App. 1933) (resident of Houston
need not accept employment in San Antonio).
128. See, e.g., Foggia v. Dix, 265 Or. 315, 321, 309 P.2d 412, 414-15 (1972) (holding
that landlord could restrict reletting to all dentists when he attempted to minimize
damages).
129. See id.
130. See, e.g., Marmont v. Axe, 135 Kan. 368, 369, 10 P.2d 826, 827 (1932) (factors
applied to commercial leasehold agreement). For example, the Alaska residential land-
lord and tenant statute specifies the grounds on which the landlord may reject an alterna-
tive tenant:
1. insufficient credit standing or financial responsibility;
2. number of persons in the household;
3. number of persons under 18 years of age in the household;
4. unwillingness of the prospective occupant to assume the same terms as
are included in the existing rental agreement;
5. proposed maintenance of pets;
6. proposed commercial activity; or
7. written information signed by a previous landlord, which shall accom-
pany the rejection, setting out abuses of other premises occupied by the prospec-
tive occupant.
Alaska Stat. § 34.03.060(d) (1975); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1951.4 (West 1985). See
generally Weissenberger, supra note 8, at 12 n.52. The issue is essentially one of fact to be
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sonably diligent efforts in searching for a substitute tenant.13
A third argument traditionally used to support the common law no
mitigation rule relies upon the contractual theory sometimes referred to
as the "lost volume" seller's rule.132 The rule, as applied to the landlord-
tenant relationship, provides that the landlord of a multi-unit building
with empty apartments will not be able to minimize his damages by sim-
ply reletting a breaching tenant's apartment, because, by doing so, he
may lose the opportunity to lease one of his other vacant apartments.13 3
This argument proves no more compelling than the other two, how-
ever, because the avoidable consequence rule is based upon the reasona-
bleness of the aggrieved party's efforts to minimize his damages.134 The
avoidable consequence rule can be applied on a case-by-case basis when
determined by the jury. See Friedman v. Colonial Oil Co., 236 Iowa 140, 18 N.W.2d 196,
198 (1945).
131. See Roberts v. Watson, 196 Iowa 816, 820, 195 N.W. 211, 213 (1923); Sommer v.
Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 456-57, 378 A.2d 767, 773 (1977); Weinstein v. Griffin, 241 N.C.
161, 165, 84 S.E.2d 549, 552 (1954); MAR-SON Inc. v. Terwaho Enter., 259 N.W.2d
289, 292 (N.D. 1977); supra note 121 and accompanying text; see also Foggia v. Dix, 265
Or. 315, 318 509 P.2d 412, 414-15 (1973) (landlord not required to lease premises for
different purpose or below fair market value); Exeter Co. v. Samuel Martin Ltd., 5 Wash.
2d 244, 249, 105 P.2d 83, 85 (1940) (honest and reasonable effort).
Proof of a reasonably diligent effort by a landlord includes, among other things, per-
sonal efforts to find new tenants, newspaper advertising, listings with real estate brokers
and posting signs. See Parkwood Realty Co. v. Marcano, 77 Misc. 2d 690, 693, 353
N.Y.S.2d 623, 626-27 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1974).
132. See generally Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages:
Sales Act and Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 66, 80-83 (1965).
133. See Storage Technology Corp. v. Trust Co., 842 F.2d 54, 56 n.2 (3d Cir. 1988);
Teradyne, Inc. v. Teledyne, Indus., 676 F.2d 865, 868 (1st Cir. 1982); Famous Knitwear
Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 254 n.5 (4th Cir. 1974); Dushoff v. Phoenix Co.,
22 Ariz. App. 445, 459, 528 P.2d 637, 641 (1974); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 456,
378 A.2d 767, 772 (1977); Humbach, supra note 2, at 1259.
The lost-seller's volume rule traditionally is applied to the breach of a sales contract.
According to the theory, the aggrieved promisee in a breach of contract should not suffer
for ensuing losses that he cannot truly prevent by making a substitute contract with an-
other party. See Ned v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972). This will occur when the substitute contract would have been
available to the promisee even if the original contract had not been breached. In other
words, but for the breach, the promisee could have had the advantage of both the original
and the second substitute contract. Accordingly, the second substitute contract does not
truly mitigate the loss from the breach of the first contract. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 347 comment f, § 350 comment d (1981).
For example, in Neri, the buyer agreed to purchase a boat from the seller. After a
down payment was rendered, the buyer defaulted on the contract. See Neri, 30 N.Y.2d at
395, 285 N.E.2d at 312, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 166-67. The seller quickly secured an alterna-
tive buyer for the boat. See id. at 396, 285 N.E.2d at 312, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 167. The
original buyer claimed that by doing this the seller mitigated his damages and, therefore,
he was liable only for any offset between the two contract prices. See id. at 396, 285
N.E.2d at 312, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 167. The court, however, held that the loss of the origi-
nal contract was unmitigatable because the second, alternate buyer could have purchased
an entirely different boat from the seller, resulting in the advantage of two boat sales to
the seller. See id. Consequently, the seller was awarded the value of the lost sale. See id.
at 401, 285 N.E.2d at 315, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
134. See supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
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dealing with multiple vacant units. In certain cases, when equity favors
the landlord, courts should not strictly enforce the mitigation doctrine.
The rule does not require the landlord to actually secure an alternative
tenant, but merely to make reasonable efforts to secure a new tenant. For
example, courts should take into account the number of vacant units the
landlord has for rent in determining the reasonableness of this effort.
135
However, in most populated urban areas where significant housing
shortages exist, 136 the availability of numerous, acceptable, alternative
tenants should place a greater burden upon the landlord in making a
reasonable effort to locate a replacement tenant.
137
A final argument against applying the avoidable consequence rule to
residential leasehold agreements holds that the rule will make tenants
less prone to complete the term of the lease.138 The tenant will not fear
the consequences of abandonment if he knows that the landlord must
attempt to relet his vacant apartment.1 39 Moreover, such widespread
abandonment of property is an invitation to vandalism."4
This ignores reality. Requiring the landlord to minimize his damages
does not completely relieve the tenant of his leasehold obligation.141 The
tenant remains liable to the landlord for that amount over and above the
rent that is secured from a replacement tenant.142 Because the landlord
will receive this offset from the abandoning tenant, he will not hesitate to
relet to a substitute tenant at a cheaper rent, imposing this additional
financial burden on the abandoning tenant. Furthermore, the aban-
doning tenant also must pay rent in order to live somewhere else.1 43 The
135. See, e.g., Dushoff v. Phoenix Co., 22 Ariz. App. 445, 528 P.2d 637, 641 (1974)
("Reasonableness is to be determined by an examination of the totality of circumstances
giving due regard to the efforts of the landlord in renting the abandoned premises, and
the number of units he has for rent."); Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 457, 378 A.2d 767,
773 (1977) ("If the landlord has other vacant apartments besides the one which the ten-
ant has abandoned, the landlord's duty to mitigate consists of making reasonable efforts
to re-let the apartment.") For example, a landlord of a multiple-unit dwelling with sev-
eral vacant apartments would not be required to make special efforts to re-let a breaking
tenant's apartment rather than the other available units.
136. See generally N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at B1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Apr. 14,
1987, at B1, col. 4.
137. Officials around the nation are concerned that over the next decade more than one
half million low- and moderate-income families may be ousted from federally subsidized
apartments built in the 1960's and 1970's. Estimates from a current New York City
survey indicate that there were approximately 72,050 vacant residential apartments for
the year 1987. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1988, at B1, col. 4. Many tenant advocates
believe a significant number of these apartments were deliberately kept off the rental mar-
ket by landlords attempting to "warehouse" them prior to conversion into cooperatives
or condominiums. See id. Preventing warehousing would alleviate the current housing
shortage by freeing up a significant number of low-income rental apartments. See id.
138. See Restatement (Second) of Property § 12.1 comment i, at 392 (1977).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See supra notes 3-4, 16-18 and accompanying text.
142. See id.
143. See Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 466, 308 A.2d 17, 20 (1973) ("[The tenant]
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possibility of such harsh financial burdens will discourage involuntary
and unnecessary abandonments by residential tenants. In addition, be-
cause application of the avoidable consequence rule requires the landlord
to attempt to relet the premises, 144 vacancies will not persist. This is
especially true in most urban areas where significant housing shortages
exist. 145
CONCLUSION
The controversy over whether to apply the avoidable consequence rule
to the residential leasehold agreement arises from a disagreement about
whether the basic nature of a lease is a conveyance of land or a contract.
To comport with modem needs, courts have applied contractual princi-
ples to the leasehold agreement. This Note concludes that this is the
better view, and therefore the avoidable consequence rule, a principle of
contract law, should be applied to the residential leasehold agreement.
Moreover, policy reasons support application of the avoidable conse-
quence to the residential leasehold agreement. The rule fosters efficiency
and maintains equity between the landlord and tenant.
In most jurisdictions, the trend toward the adoption of the avoidable
consequence rule to the residential leasehold agreement has been primar-
ily statutory. 146 This produces a more efficient and equitable system by
giving each jurisdiction the capacity to tailor the rule to its own particu-
lar housing market. For example, the Tennessee statute requires land-
lords to mitigate damages only in densely populated areas.' 47 This policy
recognizes the difficulties that a landlord in a rural area may encounter in
securing an alternative tenant. Thus, an apparent resolution of the con-
fusion among the courts is for state legislatures to adopt statutes applying
the rule to residential leasehold agreements. Until this is done, however,
courts should clarify the existing confusion by judicially imposing the
avoidable consequence rule to residential leasehold agreements.
Thomas A. Lucarelli
may be unable to find other quarters that he can afford and that he wishes to rent and in
any event he will be saddled with the not inconsiderable expenses of moving.").
144. See supra notes 3-4, 16-18 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 15.
147. See id.
[Vol. 57
